Employers’ brief trial contracts generate volatile employment histories

Ryan Bigg posted on 12 Oct 2026 that he had applied for “over 3 dozen jobs” and heard back from 24 of them with a rejection.

The observable pattern is that an employer hires a developer, lets the engagement run for a few months, and then ends it. When the engagement ends, the résumé records a brief employment spell. Repeating this loop produces a résumé populated with multiple short‑duration entries, punctuated by a single longer remote role. The loop itself creates two coupled effects. First, each termination adds a negative data point that reduces the candidate’s perceived stability.

The mechanism rests on a timing incentive. An employer can evaluate a new hire within a bounded period; if the desired output is not evident by the end of that period, the employer terminates the contract. The candidate, in turn, must demonstrate value within the same bounded period to avoid termination. The candidate’s résumé then reflects the employer’s decision rather than the candidate’s latent capacity.

The party that controls the evaluation horizon would repeatedly prune engagements that have not yet yielded visible results, generating a record of brief collaborations and a corresponding loss of confidence among future partners. The feedback loop would be identical: short evaluation → termination → volatile record → reduced trust → further short evaluations.

The comment about a 3.5‑hour train ride underscores that hybrid arrangements are not feasible for him, limiting the set of employers who can accommodate his preferred mode of work.

The loop remains open because it is unclear whether any employer will adjust the length of the evaluation window or change the criteria used at the termination point.